Ashley J Tellis, Tata chair for strategic affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, feels Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent state visit to the United States was a huge success. Both parties achieved their goals, and the visit underscored India’s importance to the United States. The two countries’ relationship has an irreversible momentum as long as the conditions that support it continue to deepen. Tellis also explores the possibility of a deeper economic relationship, the emphasis on knowledge partnership, and the obstacles created by values and interests divides.

Ashley J Tellis, the Tata chair for strategic affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is a leading expert on India-America relations. In the midst of Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi’s official visit to Washington, HT spoke with Tellis through email about the present state of Delhi-DC relations.

In the history of high-level visits between India and the United States (US), how would you rate PM Modi’s state visit to the US, and has the relationship reached an impasse?

The historical importance of PM Modi’s recent visit remains to be seen. Only time will tell whether it had a big and long-lasting influence. transformative visits are generally rare if by transformative we mean visits that significantly alter the course of history. On this score, Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China set the standard. In the post-Cold War period, I believe there was only one such transformational encounter in US-India relations: PM Manmohan Singh’s 2005 visit to Washington, with Bill Clinton’s 2000 and George W. Bush’s 2006 tours to India as possible runners-up.

But, if we set aside history for a moment and just look at PM Modi’s recent meeting with President (Joe) Biden on its own terms, I would call it a huge success because both parties got what they wanted. Biden sought to demonstrate his personal goodwill for the Prime Minister by allocating time for private discussions. More broadly, Washington intended to emphasize India’s importance to the United States, and between the pomp and spectacle of the visit and the real achievements, this message was delivered loud and clear. Modi intended to solidify US backing for India’s progress, primarily through technology and other types of collaboration, which he received in spades.

If this isn’t a win-win situation, I don’t know what is. Is this, however, an irreversible trend in US-India relations? For the time being, they do — and will continue to do so as long as the underlying conditions that promote their deepening persist.

Did you ever imagine that when you first advocated for a stronger India-US connection, America would be exporting jet engine technology and India would be buying sophisticated drones from the US? Could GE be the paradigm for the future, as one administration official told HT?

I’ve always wanted to see the bilateral relationship get to this stage, and in some respects, I’m disappointed that we haven’t. Don’t misunderstand me. We’ve gone a long way, quickly, and in some dramatic ways. However, we are still a long way from the vision I outlined in my 2005 monograph, India as a New Global Power, and other writings. I believe we can and should make additional progress in three areas. We have a long way to go in reconciling our worldview differences, both conceptually and in terms of their influence on specific international challenges. We can do much better in terms of attaining true defensive interoperability, and we need to be more daring.

Can technology transfers act as a catalyst for the formation of such a symbiotic relationship? I have my doubts. The decision to coproduce the GE F414 engine is an important step forward because the US government released more technology to a non-ally than is customary; however, even if this model were widely replicated, it would not be sufficient to build the kind of economic interdependence between our countries that is required to advance our interests.

The American government has sent a strong signal to American capital to invest in India. What is causing this convergence of strategic and commercial interests, and what are the implications?

I consider the official US push to US businesses to invest in India as part of a greater grand strategic objective of diversifying away from China. Given the current economic developments in India, this is a wise encouragement. Hopefully, American companies would perceive India as an opportunity and make bold decisions as a result. However, it is critical to remember that the US government can only foster this tendency, not make it a reality. Whether or if increased large-scale American investment in India occurs will be determined by how American private companies evaluate the potential for profit. This, in turn, will be determined by their evaluation of India’s economic climate. At the present, I regard US corporations interested in India as a risk-aversion strategy.

One of the most noticeable aspects of the connection in recent years has been the emphasis on the knowledge partnership. You came here from Bombay to study; there are currently 200,000 Indian students here. What is different now, and what is driving this emphasis?

The expanding knowledge relationship is critical to the future success of both Americans and Indians, and it is tied to structural imperatives on both sides. India has a large pool of human capital that is not always efficiently engaged at home, and the United States may profit from both expanding and absorbing that pool. That is part of the bigger tale of what makes America great, and it can help sustain America’s future innovation even as its own population changes in size and structure. Despite its limitations, the United States remains the global technological leader, which opens up potential for India to benefit from closer integration with the American innovation system. Indian-Americans and Indian nationals already make significant contributions to that system.

You observed the complicated maze of export control systems as you went through the nuclear deal. Do you sense a true, and virtually unprecedented, willingness in Washington to not let legislation and bureaucratic habits get in the way of the strategic trade conversation, the GE deal, and Indus-X?

There is a willingness to reconsider the nature and utility of the existing limits, but we are still in the early stages. The quickest method to inspire change is not to start with big legislation or policy reforms. We tried that during the nuclear deal, and it was extremely difficult. In today’s environment, it may be better to take a different approach: create smart joint ventures that push the frontiers of collaborative action, opening the door to legislative or policy reform. This approach could be demonstrated through the effort on crucial and emerging technologies. The strategic trade discussion takes a different approach, but whether it produces the desired benefits remains to be seen.

From the Quad to the I2U2, from the Artemis Accord to the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative, from the Mineral Security Partnership to MDB reform, India and the US appear to be conversing on topics that extend far beyond bilateral ties. What do you think about the institutional drivers of this increased integration?

This is a positive development that will only gain traction if both countries’ interests and beliefs remain aligned. Much of this collaboration is currently tinged by concerns about China and the signs and ramifications of rising Chinese dominance. The key will be whether this cooperation can be sustained as a stimulus even outside of China.

During the visit, there was a clear contradiction in the political beliefs of the Democratic Party’s base and the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) base, as evidenced by Barack Obama’s comments, a letter from 75 US legislators to Biden urging him to raise democratic issues with Modi, and the response of Indian ministers to Obama’s comments. However, neither government has yet authorised it to sever relations. What do you think will happen, and will it derail ties?

If the tendencies cited by India’s detractors continue, disagreements over values have the potential to stymie the gradual transformation of ties, to the detriment of both countries. As you pointed out, the fact that they have not intruded perniciously thus far is due to government efforts on both sides, but especially to the Biden administration’s desire to pummelled India over human rights and religious liberties. This resistance stems from a high belief in India’s centrality in the competition with China. However, it would be a mistake to believe that India’s rivalry with China provides it with complete immunity. Already, the administration is split on granting India a pass, and New Delhi’s detractors on Capitol Hill, in American civil society, and even in the diaspora are growing—including Republicans. So it’s not only a battle between the BJP and the Democratic Left. It concerns me that ideals that once strongly bonded the bonded States and India, even during their most difficult times, now appear to be a source of rising contention. At a time when India’s interests are best served by staying a source of adoration in the United States, disconcerting trends within the country only threaten to make it a troubling issue for Washington.

Your Foreign Affairs column, titled America’s Bad Bet on India, about what the US should not expect from India caused quite a commotion. HT questioned both NSA Jake Sullivan and US Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti about the concern that India would not rally behind the US in the event of a Taiwan crisis — Sullivan stated that a relationship evolves and isn’t a snapshot in time, and Garcetti stated that there is a 99% chance that the US would amass troops in India and India would send ships to the Taiwan straits. So, first, how would you react to the administration’s clarification of its expectations? And two, if I may be naughty, given what appears to be a convergence of expectations at the top, do you believe visit and the fundamentals being put in place, the US is making a good bet on India?

I don’t disagree with NSA Sullivan or Ambassador Garcetti’s arguments. I hope that the bilateral relationship evolves to the point where India would one day find it comfortable to participate in a US-led military coalition even outside of a United Nations Security Council mandate. Outside of the most extreme scenarios, both the United States and India can and will do a wide range of things. But, because I am worried about US national security, I cannot ignore the most difficult issues, nor can I simply wish them away. What these events remind us of — and the current conflict in Ukraine is a prime example — is that India defines its interests in ways that are not always identical to ours. This reality will become more difficult for the US as Indian power rises over time, and it is unlikely to go away regardless of how tight our cooperation grows. It is also important to note that India’s history, self-image, level of development, and, eventually, its own objectives all place objective constraints on how far the US-India relationship can progress. Recognising these limitations is not an invitation to despair, but rather a necessity for protectio