Germany’s 64-page China policy plan was tempered by the absence of specific steps to reduce the risk associated with it. That is evocative of the traditional contradictions that have engulfed the German state ever since it came into existence as it is now.
What significance does this paper have for Germany, if any? What does it add to the dialogue in Europe about de-risking China? And what guidance does it provide for Europe’s major issues in a post-Ukraine world?
In essence, it is less about turning it into an actual economic policy initiative than it is about German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s commitment to deliver on creating a coalition agreement with China.
This viewpoint makes things less depressing. This fairly intriguing document also signals the end of the prosperous period in relations between Germany and China.
Many people were shocked by the ability of a Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chancellor to place corporate issues on a secondary level.
The pro-China corporate lobby groups and a China-unfriendly economic affairs ministry needed to be balanced with each other, according to the optimists. The ambiguity of a paper that notes the issues but provides no solutions caused the pessimists to sigh.
Although analysis cannot dispel the pervasive uncertainty surrounding this global dynamic, it can simplify the complexity of the decisions and events that seem to follow.
